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NOTES AND COMMENTS
DIVORCE in absentia UPoN DEosrrmoN
The conduct of litigation in wartime is not without attendant difficul-
ties. To protect the rights of defendants whose enforced absence on
military service would hamper an adequate defence, Congress enacted
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.1 That statute, however,
was not primarily intended to supply aid to the service-man plaintiff who
is likewise necessarily absent. In the average case no special aid is need-
ed since that plaintiff may leave his affairs in the hands of an attorney-
in-fact and may supply all necessary personal testimony through the
form of depositions. 2 Personal attendance of the plaintiff at the trial,
customary under ordinary conditions, is not a requisite and may well be
dispensed with. In one special situation, however, the enforced absence
of the plaintiff presents a serious hinderance to the preservation or en-
forcement of his rights and that is in the case of suit for absolute divorce
in which the default of the defendant has been taken.
Local court rules, adopted prior to the present conflict, forbid the
granting of divorce unless the plaintiff is physically present in the court-
room at the hearing of such case.5 The slight inconvenience caused by
such rules in normal times becomes an almost insurmountable burden
when the plaintiff, compelled by his residence to use such court,4 is ob-
liged thereby to be present in court at a time when his military duties
force him to be elsewhere, perhaps overseas. By reason of such unfortun-
ate impasse, unless presence can be dispensed with and testimony be
supplied by deposition as in other civil cases, the marital status of the
parties, with its attendant duties, must go unchanged until more favor-
able circumstances permit.
Attacks have been made upon such rules, at least in the nisi prius
courts, in an effort to relieve the tension. The burden of all such assaults
has been that a violation of the constitutional guarantee calling for the
granting of justice promptly and without delay has occurred.5 Despite
such criticism, the nisi prius judges in Cook County appear to have ad-
hered to the position disclosed by their rules and have refused to accept
either the plaintiff's deposition or the testimony of other witnesses in the
plaintiff's absence. 6 The charge that such action amounts to an affront
1 50 U.S.C.A. § 501, et seq.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 51, § 26, makes special provision for the taking of
depositions of service men.
3 See Rule 60, § 4, of the Circuit Court of Cook County, effective January 1.
1934; Rule 60, § 4, of the Superior Court of Cook County, effective November 15,
1937. The text of the rules is set out at note 12, post.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 6.
5 all. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 19.
6 See newspaper accounts of the action taken in the nisi prius courts in the
cases of Kinsley v. Kinsley (Superior Court of Cook County), Chicago Daily
Tribune of January 21, 1944, and of Scherenberg v. Scherenberg (Circuit Court of
Cook County), Chicago Daily Tribune of January 27, 1944.
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upon the state constitution is a serious one, but an understanding of the
fundamental situation underlying such rules should reveal the soundness
of the judicial position and should operate to negative any impression
that the nisi prius judges are lacking in sympathy with the plight of
service men unable to comply therewith.
There can be no question of the general power of the courts to adopt
rules governing proceedings before them since affirmative grant to that
effect appears in the Illinois statutes. 7 Even independently of statute,
courts possess an inherent power to adopt rules8 provided the same are
uniform in operation and not contrary to the constitution and the statutes
of the state.9 Such rules as may be adopted will be upheld if they are rea-
sonable, 10 and will possess the binding force of law both on the courts and
upon the litigants conducting proceedings therein."
The specific rule in question, identical in both the local courts having
jurisdiction of divorce cases, reads as follows: "No decree of divorce in
any case will be granted upon the unsupported testimony of the plaintiff
or without the appearance of the plaintiff in open court."'1 2 Certainly, no
criticism can be directed to the first clause thereof as the same merely
restates the mandate of the Illinois statute concerning divorces. That stat-
ute, since 1874, has provided that: "If the complaint is taken as confessed
the court shall proceed to hear the cause by examination of witnesses in
open court, and in no case of default shall the court grant a divorce, unless
the judge is satisfied that... the cause of divorce has been fully proven by
reliable witnesses .. ."13 The reiteration of the word "witnesses" therein
even gives emphasis to the rule in question, while the requirement that
the divorce hearing shall take place in open court was once declared to
have been enacted to put an end to the practice of referring such causes
to a master in chancery. 14 That practice had given rise to much scandal
and gave Chicago a reputation for being a Mecca attractive to disgruntled
and dissatisfied married people where divorce could be speedily and se-
cretly accomplished.
The second clause of the rules under consideration merely serves to
carry out the policy of that statute, for courts hearing divorce cases do
not exercise an unlimited discretion to grant divorces whenever they may
deem it expedient or desirable. Their power to act is derived from the stat-
7 In. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, § 72.25 and § 72.28.
8 Koch v. Dickinson, 152 Ill. App. 413 (1910); People v. Conzo, 307 Ill. App. 169,
30 N.E. (2d) 106 (1940).
9 People v. Davis, 357 Ill. 396, 192 N.E. 210 (1934).
10 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Core, 126 Ill. App. 272 (1906), affirmed in 223
Ill. 58, 79 N.E. 108 (1906).
11 Feldott v. Featherstone, 290 Il. 485, 125 N.E. 361 (1919); People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Association v. Feinberg, 348 Ill. 549, 181 N.E. 437 (1932); Kelley v.
United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 275 Ill. App. 112 (1934).
12 Rule 60, § 4. The text is identical for both the Circuit and the Superior Court
of Cook County.
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 9.
14 Hall v. Hall, 201 Ill. App. 589 (1916).
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ute and they must conform strictly to its provisions. 15 At the same time,
they bear a responsibility to the public when passing upon such cases for
the public, as well as the immediate parties, is concerned in every mar-
riage and its dissolution. 16 Such responsibility was emphatically declared
by the Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of Decker v. Decker," where the
court said that the separation of married persons by decree "concerns...
the people, the public morals, the prevailing system of social order, and,
in a greater or lesser degree, the welfare of every citizen. These interests
are not represented by either of the parties to a divorce proceeding, but
the law has not left them unprotected. It is within the power of the chancel-
lor of whom a decree of divorce is asked to stand as a representative of the
public, and, in a proper case, to refuse to grant the decree though the
grounds of such refusal be without the issues made by the pleadings of the
parties.' 8 For this reason, the statute regarding divorce has been held to
vest a considerable degree of discretion in the Chancellor, both with re-
gard to the degree of proof and other matters. 19
Upon this basis, the balance of these rules would seem to be designed
to provide the Chancellor with the means of exercising such discretion by
giving him an opportunity to make any and every necessary investigation
in order to protect the interests of the public. The Chancellor is enabled,
by requiring the presence of the plaintiff along with other witnesses in
open court, to ascertain the bona fides of the case. Through intelligent
questioning of the plaintiff he is enabled to verify matters concerning resi-
dence and domicile as well as facts concerning the ground of divorce re-
lied upon. It is not disputed that the plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case by other witnesses than himself, but such interrogation will provide
the basis for the exercise of discretion and enable the judge to be "satisfied
.. that the cause of divorce has been fully proven by reliable witnesses."
20
The policy evident in the statue would seem, therefore, to be aided and re-
inforced by the rules in question.
Whether or not depositions will serve as an available means of proof
in divorce cases has been an even more vexing question. The requirement
of the statute is that the cause shall be heard "by examination of witnesses
in open court." 21 By reason of such language, it was held in Suesemilch
v. Suesemilch22 that the testimony of one witness in open court and the
introduction of the deposition of another witness was insufficient compli-
ance with the statute. A decree based on such testimony was reversed.
No doubt was cast upon that holding until, in the case of Hazard v. Haz-
15 Thomas v. Thomas, 51 Ill. 162 (1869); Trenchard v. Trenchard, 245 Ill. 313,
92 N.E. 243 (1910); Floberg v. Floberg, 358 Ill. 626, 193 N.E. 456 (1934).
16 See article by Hon. John C. Lewe entitled "When the Tide Turns," in 25
Chicago Bar Record 367 (1944).
17 193 II. 285, 61 N.E. 1108 (1901).
18 193 Ill. 285 at 287, 61 N.E. 1108.
19 Lorenz v. Lorenz, 93 Ill. 376 (1879).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 9.
21 Ibid.
22 43 Ill. App. 573 (1892).
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ard,23 the court sustained a decree of divorce against attack by bill of re-
view. Among the grounds relied upon for review was the fact that, while
one witness had testified in open court, the testimony of the other witness
was given in the form of a deposition. When holding that the bill of review
was properly dismissed, the court placed principal emphasis upon the
laches of the plaintiff. It did say, however, that: "A witness heard by de-
position is as much heard in open court as is one who appears in person
before the court ... equal effect is to be accorded to the testimony of wit-
nesses produced by deposition as to those produced in open court and tes-
tifying viva voce .... "24
Such statement would be unquestionable in any ordinary proceeding.
In fact, the disposition of cases under the old equity practice called for no
other testimony than that evidenced in the form of the sworn pleadings or
that provided by depositions taken out of court. The fallacy of the state-
ment, however, lies in the fact that a divorce case is not an ordinary pro-
ceeding in equity. The entire basis for jurisdiction in such cases is statu-
tory, the procedure therein is expressly regulated by statute, 25 and is sub-
ject to whatever special requirements the legislature may see fit to im-
pose. One such requirement is the one above mentioned calling for the
examination of witnesses in open court. 26 Inasmuch as the Chancellor, in
the absence of a demand for jury trial, 27 must decide all questions of
credibility and the weight to be given to the testimony, he should be in a
position to observe the witnesses as they testify so as to judge the fair-
ness or falsity of their evidence. If he is to be denied such opportunity
and be confined to written depositions, he will be unable to perform his
true function. For such reasons, depositions as a substitute for oral
testimony should not be regarded as acceptable.
The language of another section of the court rules under consideration
would seem to sanction the practice of using depositions, but it is subject
to an important qualification that should not be overlooked, to-wit: deposi-
tions cannot be taken except where the use thereof is "permitted by
law." 28 Matrimonial causes not infrequently involve other related matters
such as the division of property rights, custody of children, determination
of alimony, and the like. In such cases and as to those points, the Chancel-
lor is dealing with an ordinary proceeding. No. objection can, therefore,
exist to the use of depositions on such issues for any form of legal proof
would be available. The statutory requirement, reiterated in the rule of
court, of viva voce testimony on the issue of whether or not a divorce
should be granted, ought to be regarded as the only form of testimony
permissible.
23 205 Ill. App. 562 (1917).
24 205 Ill. App. 562 at 569.
25 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, § 7.
26 Ibid., § 9.
27 Ibid., § 8.
28 Rule 60, § 3, identical in both courts, reads in part: " . . . All testimony in
any such case shall be taken by examination of witnesses in open court, except
where the use of depositions otherwise taken is permitted by law."
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Divorce upon deposition, granted in the absence of the plaintiff,
smacks too much of the mail-order divorce so frequently condemned by
juristic writers. It is hoped that the unfortunate circumstances of war
will not influence the courts to change rules possessing such substantial
social value.
W. F. ZACHARAS
SHOULM "PROPER PURPOSE" AFFEcT SHAREHOLDER's RIGHT OF INsPECTION?
When business first began to keep books and records it engendered a
problem which still tends to harass the courts, to-wit: by whom and under
what circumstances may such records be examined. Appendant to that
problem is the subordinate one as to the procedural means which may be
utilized to enforce the right of inspection, assuming that one exists.1 In the
case of the individual proprietorship little dispute can exist since the pro-
prietor, as owner of the records, can exert full dominion over the same.2
Much the same doctrine exists in the case of the partnership,3 although
the partner's use of information obtained by an inspection thereof may be
subject to limitation.4
In the case of the joint stock company, 5 and of the chartered corpora-
tion, however, the problem is not so simple particularly since the share-
holder, pursuant to the entity theory of separate personality, is not the
owner of the company records. The nature of the relationship existing
between the shareholder and the corporation, though, entitles the former,
as a matter of right, to have access to the books and the things contained
therein. Such right is founded upon the necessity of self-protection for
the investor whose capital has been risked in the enterprise and who has
legitimate concern in its profitable and honest employment.
The principal difficulty in that regard has arisen not so much in con-
nection with the right of inspection as in the manner of its enforcement.
Attempts to arrive at adjustment between the shareholder and the cor-
poration, or more precisely its management, without placing hindering
limitations in the path of the one nor subjecting the other to burdensome
1 No consideration is herein given to the right of third persons, including gov-
ernmental agencies, to use inquiry or subpoena for the purpose of obtaining
information necessary for taxation, for criminal prosecution, for evidentiary
purposes, and the like.
2 For the right to use judicial process to obtain the same, see Di Angeles v.
Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 191 N.E. 426 (1934). Upon death of the proprietor, the legal
representative succeeds to the same right: Moore v. Brandenburg, 248 Ill. 232,
93 N.E. 733 (1911).
3 In Sanderson v. Cooke, 256 N.Y. 73 at 78, 175 N.E. 518 at 520 (1931), the court
said: "The general rule regarding business partnership books is that the books
should be kept, open to the inspection of any partner at all reasonable times, even
after dissolution, subject, however, to special agreement." See also Albee v.
Wachter, 74 Ill. 173 (1874).
4 Trego v. Hunt [1896] A.C. 7; Chamberlain v. Hemingway, 97 Conn. 156, 115 A.
632 (1921).
5 In re Hatt, 108 N.Y.S. 468 (1907).
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probings, have met with varied success. Such attempts have ranged
from the use of the common law writ of mandamus to compel inspection,
through statutory recognition of an absolute right thereto, to the imposi-
tion of penalties for an improper denial thereof. Yet through none of
these, nor any combination of them, have the rights of the respective
parties been readily accommodated. The principal stumbling block
lies over the question whether the shareholder should be obliged to
show a proper purpose for his contemplated examination or whether the
corporation should be obliged to justify its refusal to permit examination
on the ground that the same is sought from improper or unlawful motives.
The recent holding of the Illinois Supreme Court, in Morris v. Broad-
view, Inc.,6 indicates that the former of these views is the one to be follow-
ed in this state. A peremptory writ of mandamus granted the petitioner
therein had required the corporate directors and the trustees under a vot-
ing trust agreement to permit petitioner, owner of a certificate of
beneficial interest for more than six months prior to demand, to examine
and make copies of certain corporate records and of the list of holders
of beneficial interests in the outstanding capital stock.7 An appeal from
such order was predicated on the ground that while the petitioner had
alleged that his purpose was proper and lawful, still he had offered no
proof on that point hence had not made out a case justifying the issuance
of the writ. Such contention was countered by petitioner's argument that
(1) such proof was required only of one who had not held stock for at
least six months preceding the demand or who held less than five per
cent. of all outstanding stock,8 or (2) that the burden was on the re-
spondent to plead and prove that the purpose was improper or unlawful,
as facts of that character would constitute an affirmative defence. 9 The
issues thus squarely raised were answered when the court, reversing the
judgment granting the writ, decided that the pertinent provision of the
Business Corporation Act1 ° applied to all shareholders, regardless of the
size or duration of the holding, and that the burden of proof was on
the petitioning shareholder.
At common law, the right of examination had to be asserted in good
faith, for a proper purpose, and at a reasonable time, hence would not be
enforced for speculative purposes or if its exercise appeared hostile to
6 385 Ill. 228, 52 N. E. (2d) 769 (1944), reversing 317 Ill. App. 436, 46 N. E. (2d)
174 (1943).
7 No point appears to have been made that plaintiff, not being a record holder
of stock in the corporation itself, had no right to examine the records. According
to the holding in Babcock v. Chicago Rys. Co., 325 Ill. 16, 155 N.E. 773 (1927), such
right does not accrue to the holder of beneficial interest certificates under a voting
trust. Right of inspection of the records of the voting trustees was preserved by
the trust agreement in the instant case, which assimilated such right to that
enjoyed by corporate shareholders: 385 Ill. 228 at 229, 52 N.E. (2d) 769 at 770.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, § 157.45.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 167, requires that certain defenses be pleaded
in affirmative fashion. Though the instant problem is not specifically named
therein, it might be covered by the reference to defenses which are likely to
surprise.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, § 157.45.
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the corporation. It was not presumed, though, that the motive was improp-
er unless challenge was directed to that point, whereupon the burden was
on the shareholder.1 The extra-ordinary remedy of mandamus was
available to vindicate the right, but, unlike habeas corpus, the writ did not
issue as a matter of absolute right,12 hence would not be granted to gratify
idle curiosity. The petitioner was obliged to have some specific interest at
stake rendering the inspection necessary, or some beneficial purpose for
which the examination was desired.18
As corporations expanded in number, size, and in power, this right of
inspection of the corporate books by the individual shareholder became
even more important. Most states, therefore, made specific provision by
statute for a more convenient enforcement of the right. Of this type was
the act adopted by the Illinois legislature in 1872. It provided that the
books of account of all the business of a corporation were open to inspec-
tion by the stockholder at all reasonable times. 14 The purpose of such
statute was not merely to restate the common law but was enacted in
view of the restrictions and limitations placed by the common law upon
the exercise of the right and with a view to protect small and minority
shareholders against the power of the majority.15
Since the writ of mandamus had been regarded as a discretionary
one, there was some confusion in Illinois, as to where the burden of proof
did rest after the passage of the statute. For a while the courts wavered
on that point for in one case it was intimated that the court had power to
deny mandamus, 16 while in Rodger Ballast Car Company v. Perrin7
it was declared that the right could not be inquired into. Other cases, how-
ever, finally settled the point. Thus, in Maremont v. Old Colony Life In-
surance Company,'8 it was held that the right of a shareholder could not
be denied by the corporation on the ground that he had an unlawful or im-
proper purpose for inspecting the books. Similarly, in Baird v. King,19 the
court declared that the motive and purpose of a shareholder seeking by
writ of mandamus to compel a corporation and its officers to allow him to
inspect the corporate books, could not be inquired into for purpose of de-
feating the writ. Again, in Wilson v. Mackinaw State Bank,20 the right was
declared to be absolute and not to depend upon any circumstance or
condition except ownership of stock.
11 State ex rel. Costello v. Middlesex Banking Co., 87 Conn. 483, 88 A. 861 (1913);
Davidson v. Alameda Consol. Mines Co., 66 Ore. 412, 134 P. 782 (1913).
12 People v. C. & E. I. R.R. Co., 262 Ill. 492, 104 N.E. 831 (1914).
Is The King v. Merchant Tailors' Co., 2 B. & Ad. 115, 109 Eng. Rep. 1086 (1831);
A. & F. R. R. Co. v. Rowley, 9 Fla. 508 (1861); State v. Sportsman's Park Ass'n.,
29 Mo. App. 326 (1888).
14 Laws 1871-2, p. 296, § 13.
15 Such was also the view of the court in Foster v. White, 86 Ala. 467, 6 So. 88
(1889), where a similar provision was involved.
16 Furst v. Rawleigh Medical Co., 282 Ill. 366, 118 N.E. 763 (1918).
17 88 Ill. App. 323 (1899).
18 189 Ill. App. 231 (1914).
19 213 Ill. App. 228 (1919).
20 217 Ill. App. 494 (1920).
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Perhaps the clearest exposition of the rationale for the statute was
expressed in Stone v. Kellogg,21 wherein the court adopted the language
of an Alabama decision, 22 which had stated ". . . the statute was enacted
in view of the restrictions and limitations placed by the common law
upon the exercise of the right, and the purpose is to protect small and
minority stockholders against the power of the majority, and against the
mismanagement and faithlessness of agents and officers. . . The only
express limitation is, that the right shall be exercised at reasonable and
proper times. The implied limitation is, that it shall not be exercised
from idle curiosity or for improper or unlawful purposes. In all other
respects the statutory right is absolute." 23
The case of Venner v. Chicago City Railway Company24 further clari-
fied the problem by stating: "Where the right is conferred by statute in
absolute terms, the purpose or motive of the shareholder in making the
demand for an inspection is not material, and he cannot be required to
state his reasons therefor.
'25
Then, in 1919, the legislature repealed the act of 1872 and replaced
it with a new statute which restricted the right of the shareholder to an
examination of the books of stock ownership by adding the limitation
that the same be "for all proper purposes. '26 A penalty provision, how-
ever, recognized the shareholder's right to examine the books of account
by granting recovery of damages if the same was improperly denied.
Despite the addition of the words "for proper purposes," the statute was
steadfastly interpreted by the courts as leaving the burden of proof
to show improper purpose upon the corporation. Thus, in Palmer v.
Diel,27 upon a petition for mandamus, the court held the motive of the
petitioner could not be inquired into. Again, in Kassin v. Grigsby-Grunow
Company,28 the court said: "Under this statute a shareholder of a cor-
poration has the absolute right to examine its records and books of ac-
count... And the fact that such shareholder is interested in a competing
company and may by such examination obtain information that will be
of benefit to the rival company, will not defeat his statutory right to
examine the books and records of the corporation. ' 29 In a suit brought
to recover damages under the penalty provision of the statute, the court
stated: "The only limitation made by law upon that right is that the
examination will be conducted at reasonable times. . ... ,0o The addition
of the apparent limitation by the phrase "for all proper purposes" in the
21 165 Ill. 192 at 205, 46 N.E. 222 at 226, 56 Am. St. Rep. 240 (1897).
22 Foster v. White, 86 Ala. 467, 6 So. 88 (1889).
23 86 Ala. 467 at 469, 6 So. 88 at 89.
24 246 Ill. 170, 92 N.E. 643, 138 Am. St. Rep. 229 (1910).
25 246 Il. 170 at 173, 92 N.E. 643 at 645.
26 Laws 1919, p. 325, § 37.
27 233 Ill. App. 508 (1924).
28 268 Ill. App. 574 (1933).
29 268 Ill. App. 574 at 577.
so Cooper v. Nutt, 254 Ill. App. 445 at 455 (1929).
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mandamus section of the statute did not, then, influence the courts to
shift the burden back to the shareholder.81
The Business Corporation Act of 1933, repealing the earlier provisions,
opened all corporate books to examination by a shareholder owning five
per cent. of the outstanding stock or who had been a shareholder for six
months prior to demand. 32 The right thereby granted purported to be
absolute except that the examination was to be limited to a reasonable
time and again for a proper purpose. As before, a penalty provision was
inserted to secure recognition of that right. The same statute declared
that nothing therein contained should impair the power of a proper court
to issue mandamus to compel production of these books for examination,
but here also was affixed the limitation calling for "proof by a shareholder
of proper purpose." 33 Because the benefits of that section appeared to
be limited to certain stockholders only, an amendment was added in 1941
which removed any implied condition of size or duration of stock-holding
on the right to apply for mandamus.
34
When the Supreme Court was called upon, in Morris v. Broadview,
Inc.,3 5 to interpret the provision so amended, it placed special stress upon
the fact that the phrase "for a proper purpose" appeared in each section
of the statute and it regarded the repetition thereof as indicative of the
fact that such words evidenced a legislative intent to place the burden
on the shareholder. It was not, however, interpreting a novel introduction
into the statute but one that had been there since 1919 and which had
already been construed many times as keeping the burden of proof on
the corporation. Legislative acquiescence in such earlier interpretation
might well be inferred, or more emphatic language would most likely
have been used.
Departing from abstract argument as to what the intention of the
legislature might have been, intermediate appellate courts subsequent
to the passage of the Business Corporation Act have left the burden of
proof on the defendant corporation. For example, in Miller v. Spanogle,36
the court indicated that its view was like that expressed by a standard
text on the subject 7 by saying: "If, in a particular jurisdiction, the motive
or purpose of the shareholder is a proper subject of judicial inquiry, it is
only so when asserted as a defense... it was not necessary for this petition
to allege facts showing the motive or purpose of the petitioner in seeking
to inspect the records and books of this company .. ."38 That view seems,
to the writer at least, the more desirable one considering the fact that
31 In a suit based on the penalty provision, the burden is on the corporate
officials to show improper purpose according to Vigran v. Hamilton, 321 Ill. App.
541, 53 N.E. (2d) 250 (1944).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, § 157.45.
33 Ibid.
34 Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 425, § 45.
35 385 Ill. 228, 52 N.E. (2d) 769 (1944).
36 275 Ill. App. 335 (1934).
37 14 C.J. 856, § 1302.
38 275 Ill. App. 335 at 341. In Wise v. Byllesby & Co., 285 IU. App. 40 at 45 (1936),
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the corporate management serves, in a sense, as the agent of the share-
holder and should be obliged to make prompt and full revelation of its
conduct at the behest of the latter.
If it should be argued that the more recent statute should be differ-
ently interpreted because it opened all corporate books to examination
as contrasted merely with books of stock ownership under former laws,
an Ohio case supplies the best answer.3 9 The statute there involved had
at one time read: "The books and records of such corporation at all rea-
sonable times shall be open to the inspection of every stockholder. '
40 It
was later amended to read: "The books of account, lists of shareholders,
voting trust agreements, if any, and minutes of meetings of every cor-
poration shall be open to inspection . .. 41 By that amendment every
conceivable corporate book was thrown open, yet the court held that the
enlargement of the scope of inspection was not meant to be a restriction
of the right to inspect. When the words "for a proper purpose" were
added to the statute, the court still refused to shift the burden to the share-
holder. 42 Explanation for suuh result may best be found in the words
of a New Jersey court which once observed that "to say they [the share-
holders] have the right, but that it can be enforced only when they have
ascertained in some way without the books that their affairs have been
mismanaged, or that their interests are in danger, is practically to deny
the right in the majority of cases. Oftentimes frauds are discoverable
only by examination of the books. . .. 43 To require the shareholder to
prove some proper purpose for his desired examination places him under
the duty of proving a negative, i. e. absence of idle curiosity on his part.
Yet, until examination has been had, he can possess nothing more than
suspicion of mismanagement hence could well be said to be an officious
busybody.
The difficulty in complying with the Illinois statute, as now inter-
preted, bids fair to defeat the very grounds upon which a right of inspec-
tion is said to exist. Assuming the decision in the Morris case to be a
proper construction of the legislative language, good ground would seem
to exist for calling for its repeal or amendment.
J. E. REEvns
the defense attorney had cross-examined the petitioner on this point and the court
said: "Although perhaps he was not required so to do, petitioner assumed the
burden of proof and established a prima facie case .... "
39 William Coale Development Co. v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St. 582, 170 N.E. 434
(1930).
40 Ohio Gen. Code § 8673.
41 Ohio Gen. Code §§ 8623-63.
42 The court stated: "When the stockholder is asking the right to inspect .. .
such request is attended by a presumption of good faith and honesty of purpose
until the contrary is made to appear ...... 121 Ohio St. 582 at 587, 170 N.E. 434
at 435.
43 Huylar v. Cragin Cattle Co., 40 N.J. Eq. 392 at 398, 2 A. 274 at 278 (1885).
